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Comment
CLEBURNE: AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP IN EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS
In City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center' the Supreme
Court addressed an issue that will have a major impact on the evolu-
tion of equal protection analysis. The Court determined that a city
zoning ordinance,' requiring a special use permit for group homes
for the mentally retarded, violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.3 Notably, a majority of the Court struck
down the ordinance "as applied" to the prospective mentally re-
tarded residents of the group home, but did not strike down the
ordinance as facially unconstitutional.4 This unprecedented result
1. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
2. The zoning ordinance in question permitted the following uses in areas desig-
nated as R-3 zones:
"1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
"2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
"3. Boarding and lodging houses.
"4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
"5. Apartment hotels.
"6. Hospitals, sanitoriums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents
or aged, other thanfor the insane or feeble minded or alcoholics or drug addicts.
"7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is
carried on as a business.
"8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal
institutions.
"9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses ......
Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252-53 n.3 (quoting § 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, as set
forth with emphasis added in Brief for Appellant at 60-61).
The City of Cleburne determined that the group home for the mentally retarded
was, in effect, a "hospital for the feebleminded." Id. at 3252-53. As such, § 16, subdivi-
sion 9 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance required that the Cleburne Living Center
(CLC) obtain a special use permit to operate the group home. Cleburne Living Center
v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3249
(1985).
3. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258-60.
4. Citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985); United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the plurality
wrote that the preferred course of adjudication was to determine whether the ordinance
deprived the respondents (CLC) of equal protection. In that case, it need not decide the
constitutionality of the ordinance as it applied to mentally retarded persons generally.
The plurality cited the need "to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional judg-
ments." Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258. For further discussion of this argument, see infra
notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
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in equal protection jurisprudence was reached after a plurality
seemingly rejected a middle level of scrutiny for the mentally re-
tarded as a class and applied what it termed a "rational basis" test.5
This Comment will discuss the plurality's rejection of middle
level scrutiny for the mentally retarded and its application of the
rational basis test. Due to the increasing effort to deinstitutionalize
mentally retarded citizens and reintegrate them into the community,
many federal and state courts are applying the equal protection
clause in fact-situations similar to that of Cleburne.6 For this reason,
Cleburne is important not for what the Court said, but for what it did.
In July 1980, Jan Hannah, Vice President of Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. (CLC), purchased a home in Cleburne, Texas.7 Ms.
Hannah intended to lease the home to CLC to be used as a group
home for mentally retarded individuals. CLC planned to house thir-
teen moderately and mildly retarded men and women. In addition
to twenty-four hour supervision, the group home staff planned to
provide training in leisure time activities, independent living skills,
and kitchen skills. All residents would eventually obtain jobs in the
community or a position at a work activity center.
The house was located in an R-3 zone, that is, an area where
apartment houses, boarding homes, and other multi-family dwell-
ings were permitted.' Due to the City's classification of the home as
a hospital for the feebleminded, its operation in an R-3 zone would
require a special use permit.9 The City subsequently denied CLC's
application for the permit at two separate public hearings.10 CLC
5. 105 S. Ct. at 3258. The plurality stated: "To withstand equal protection review,
legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id.
6. See, e.g., Kolpack v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 373-74 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Knutzen v.
Nelson, 617 F. Supp 977, 984 (D. Colo. 1985); Steiberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315,
1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub noma. Steiberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986);
Matter of Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 310-11 (Minn. 1986).
7. The statement of facts is taken from the Fifth Circuit opinion, Cleburne Living
Center v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S.
Ct. 3249 (1985).
8. See supra note 2.
9. See supra note 2. If CLC had obtained the permit, it would have had to reapply on
a yearly basis. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 194.
10. The council members considered the following factors in denying the special use
permit:
(1) The attitude of property owners within two hundred feet of the proposed home.
(2) The location of a junior high school right across the street from the proposed
home.
(3) The fears of elderly neighborhood residents.
(4) The size of the home and the number of people it would house.
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then filed for injunctive relief and damages in federal district court.
Applying a rational basis test, the district court denied both the
injunctive relief and damages.'l CLC appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit which held that the mentally retarded
were a quasi-suspect class. 12 In reaching this conclusion the Fifth
Circuit stated:
The combination of these factors-historical preju-
dice, political powerlessness, and immutability-calls for
heightened scrutiny of classifications discriminating against
the mentally retarded. We are not prepared to say that
they are a full-fledged suspect class, however. Strict scru-
tiny has been reserved for classifications, such as race, that
"tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal." [cita-
tion omitted] Though mental retardation is irrelevant to
many policies, it is a relevant distinction in some cases."
Applying heightened scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit struck down the
Cleburne zoning ordinance both on its face and as applied.' 4 The
City filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which the Supreme Court
granted.
Although the Court unanimously agreed to vacate the lower
court's judgment, its members disagreed on the appropriate analy-
sis. In a plurality opinion written by Justice White, four members of
the Court stated that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect
classification.' 5 Therefore, statutes singling out the mentally re-
tarded for special treatment required no greater scrutiny than that
traditionally given to social or economic legislation.' 6 Nonetheless,
the plurality found that the statute, as applied, was not rationally
related to the City's purported objectives.' 7 As a result, the plural-
ity concluded that the zoning ordinance, although constitutional on
its face, was unconstitutional as it applied to the mentally retarded
residents of the Cleburne group home. 18
(5) The uncertainty of legal responsibility for the actions of any of the mentally
retarded residents.
(6) The location of the home on a five hundred year flood plain.
Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 194.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 197.
13. Id. at 198 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)).
14. Id. at 200.
15. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985).
16. Id. at 3254, 3258.




Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judg-
ment but disagreed with the application of the traditional, three-
tiered equal protection model.' 9 Instead, they espoused a simpler,
more flexible standard under which a court examines the public
purpose of challenged legislation and the class that it affects.20
Under this model, these two Justices found that the Cleburne ordi-
nance unjustly discriminated against the mentally retarded residents
because it served no legitimate governmental interest.2' Rather
than protecting the prospective residents, the City in fact was ca-
tering to the irrational fears of the neighboring property owners.22
Because catering to these fears is not a legitimate legislative objec-
tive, the ordinance, according to Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
Burger, was unconstitutional.2 3
Finally, Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun, maintained that classifications affect-
ing the mentally retarded should be afforded heightened scrutiny.24
Examining the Cleburne ordinance under such a level of scrutiny,
Justice Marshall determined that the ordinance was unconstitution-
ally overbroad and, therefore, invalid on its face.25
An understanding of Cleburne requires a thorough grasp of the
development of current equal protection jurisprudence. Before an-
alyzing the Cleburne decision itself, this Comment will review current
equal protection law with an emphasis on heightened scrutiny. In
particular, Professor Gerald Gunther's model, which outlines the
boundaries of heightened scrutiny, will be studied. Next, since
heightened scrutiny developed through a series of gender-based
discrimination cases, those cases will be discussed. The review of
the gender-based cases will demonstrate the various tenets of the
Gunther model. Having traced the development of middle level
scrutiny through the Gunther model and the gender-based cases,
this Comment will then analyze the Cleburne decision. The analysis
will compare the decision to the Gunther model and the gender-
based cases. This comparison should provide valuable insights into
the future development of equal protection analysis.
19. Id. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 3261-62.
21. Id. at 3262-63.
22. Id. at 3262.
23. Id. at 3263.
24. Id. at 3272 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25. Id. at 3275.
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I. CURRENT EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Rational Basis vs. Strict Scrutiny
Current equal protection jurisprudence involves a three-tiered
model that requires different levels of scrutiny depending on the
nature of a challenged statutory classification. The rational basis
test requires only that there be a rational relationship between a
statutory classification and a legitimate governmental interest. 26
This test is usually applied in cases concerning economic or social
legislation.27
When applying the rational basis test, courts are free to supply
or hypothesize a governmental interest that may relate to the statu-
tory classification. As long as there is a "plausible reason ' 28 for a
legislature's actions, it is constitutionally irrelevant whether those
reasons, in actuality, underlie the legislation. 29 Although the state is
free to offer a rationale for its actions, it is not required to do so. 3 0
Since the rational basis test requires only a minimal level of scrutiny,
most social and economic legislation can withstand the test quite
easily.
The most intensive level of judicial scrutiny, strict scrutiny, is
afforded those statutory classifications that are either inherently sus-
pect or infringe upon a fundamental right. Recognized suspect clas-
sifications include race, 1 alienage, 2 and national origin."3 A right
is considered fundamental if it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution. '34 Voting35 and the right to travel3 6 are two
26. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (Rail-
road Retirement Act allowing dual railroad and social security benefits for some railroad
workers but not for others depending on the number of years of railroad service upheld
under rational basis standard); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (City of New
Orleans ordinance excepting certain vendors from a ban on selling food from push carts
was an economic regulation and was upheld against an equal protection claim under the
rational basis test); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Maryland welfare legis-
lation upheld under rational basis standard).
27. See supra note 26.
28. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 449 U.S. at 179.
29. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
30. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 (1982) (State of Alaska asserted three
rationales for Alaskan oil dividend plan even though rational basis standard was used).
31. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
32. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
34. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
36. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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examples of rights so fundamental that any classifications impinging
on them must be subject to strict scrutiny.37 A classification can sur-
vive strict scrutiny only if it is justified by a "compelling governmen-
tal interest." 38
Due to the rigorous nature of strict scrutiny and the limp nature
of the rational basis test, the Court began in the early 1970s to de-
velop a third, middle level of scrutiny, often referred to as "height-
ened scrutiny." As various classes with important interests brought
their cases before the Court, some of the Justices recognized the
need for an intermediate form of review that could fill the gap "be-
tween the largely toothless invocation of minimum rationality and
the nearly fatal invocation of strict scrutiny. ' 31
B. Heightened Scrutiny
In his review of the 1971 Supreme Court term40 Professor Ger-
ald Gunther foresaw the development of this new, middle level of
scrutiny:
The model suggested by the recent developments
would view equal protection as a means-focused, relatively
narrow, preferred ground of decision in a broad range of
cases. Stated most simply, it would have the Court take se-
riously a constitutional requirement that has never been
formally abandoned: that legislative means must substan-
tially further legislative ends.41
The Gunther model proposed basic changes in judicial treat-
ment of equal protection questions. The rationale for the chal-
lenged classification was of major importance in Gunther's
approach. Unlike the rational basis test, the new model required
that the Court ... be less willing to supply justifying ratio-
37. CLC could not invoke strict scrutiny by claiming that the right to housing was
fundamental. In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court refused to recognize
the "need for a decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's
home" as fundamental rights that trigger strict scrutiny. "We do not denigrate the im-
portance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill .... Absent constitutional mandate,
the assurance of adequate housing... [is a] legislative, not judical function[]." Id. at 73-
74.
38. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 419, 432 (1984).
39. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-30, at 1082 (1978).
40. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
41. Id. at 20. As Gunther observed, the Court initially advanced this position in Roy-
ster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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nales by exercising its imagination. It would have the
Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that
have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.
Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonable-
ness of questionable means on the basis of materials that
are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to rational-
izations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing. 2
Thus, the first prong of the Gunther model precluded the Court
from supplying any objective or purpose for a statutory classifica-
tion.4" The burden of production lay with the party seeking to up-
hold the classification. 4
Second, Gunther suggested that the Court should put more
emphasis on the nature of the classification than on the underlying
legislative purpose.45 In this respect, the Gunther model is less rig-
orous than strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the Court examines
the legislative purpose underlying a classification. Unless there is a
compelling state interest for the classification, the statute must
fall.4 6 As a result, strict scrutiny review pays little attention to the
characteristics of the classification.
Even though Gunther emphasized the nature of the classifica-
tion, he did not ignore legislative objectives.4 7 His approach,
although less rigorous than strict scrutiny, was more searching than
the traditional rational basis test." This method-"means-ori-
ented" scrutiny-would, in effect, allow a legislature to select means
that substantially further its objectives. Thus, middle level scrutiny
requires a close relationship between the classification and the legis-
lative objective, but the fit need not be as tight as that required for
strict scrutiny classifications.49
42. Gunther, supra note 40, at 21.
43. Professor Tribe also recognized that a court may not supply a rationale for a
challenged rule under heightened scrutiny. However, he articulated another character-
istic of intermediate review, called "limiting afterthought." Limiting afterthought re-
quires that a proferred rationale "not be credited ... if there are convincing reasons to
believe that the objective is being supplied purely by hindsight." L. TRIBE, supra note
39, § 16-30, at 1085-88.
44. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
45. Gunther, supra note 40, at 21.
46. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. Indeed, as Professor Tribe noted, one of the requirements of the new level of
scrutiny was that "the objective served by a challenged classification . . . be important
,even if the need not be as compelling' as strict scrutiny would demand." L. TRIBE, Supra
note 39, § 16-30, at 1083.
48. Gunther, supra note 40, at 21.
49. Professor Tribe also identified this characteristic of heightened scrutiny. L.
TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-30, at 1083.
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A third characteristic of the Gunther model involved its use as a
technique that allowed the Court to avoid overly broad constitu-
tional decisions. Gunther saw the new model as less intrusive than
strict scrutiny because his model focused on the actual "purposes
chosen by the legislatures, not 'constitutional' interests drawn from
the value perceptions of the Justices."5 The new level of scrutiny
allowed the Court to decide a case on narrower, statutory grounds,
avoiding a constitutional issue altogether, if possible. In addition,
the use of heightened scrutiny did not expand strict scrutiny beyond
its already well-defined scope.
Over the course of the 1970s, the Supreme Court refined
heightened scrutiny. The approach struck a balance between the
deferential approach of the rational basis test, in which a statute is
presumed to be constitutional, and the nondeferential strict scrutiny
test. The Court's ratification of Gunther's model is best illustrated
by the cases challenging gender-based classifications. 5'
By comparing the application of heightened scrutiny in the gen-
der-based classifications to its application in classifications based on
mental retardation one can better understand the Cleburne decision.
C. Gender-Based Decisions
1. Reed.-Prior to the 1970s, classifications based on gender
were subject to the rational basis test. In 1971, the Supreme Court
began to provide some realistic protection against gender discrimi-
nation in state legislation. In Reed v. Reed 52 the Court invalidated an
Idaho probate statute that gave men priority over women in cases in
which both had applied for appointment as the administrator of a
50. Gunther, supra note 40, at 31.
51. Although this Comment will focus here on gender-based classifications, the
Court has afforded intermediate level treatment to classifications based on illegitimacy
and alienage. For example, in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), the Court struck
down a Texas statute that required a paternity suit to be brought before the child is one
year old. The Court stated: "[T]his unrealistically short time limitation is not substan-
tially related to the State's interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent
claims." Id. at 101. The "substantial relationship" language reveals the Court's use of
middle level scrutiny. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), is an example of the Court's
treating alienage as a classification that justifies middle level scrutiny. In Pyler the Court
struck down another Texas statute that allowed the state to withhold funds from local
school districts for the education of children not legally admitted into the United States;
the statute also gave those school districts the authority to deny such children enroll-
ment. Although the Court did not label its analysis middle level or heightened scrutiny,
it did say "the discrimination contained in ... [the Texas statute] can hardly be consid-
ered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State." Id. at 224 (emphasis
added).
52. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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decedent's estate.5" The Court purported to use a rational basis
test,54 but it did not assume the normal deferential stance toward
the statutory classification. Although the Court recognized that the
statute did serve the legitimate objective "of reducing the workload
on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests,"'5 5 it struck
down the statute as arbitrary. 56
Gunther, however, questioned whether the gender criterion in
the Idaho statute was as arbitrary as the Court had stated:
It is difficult to understand [this] result without an as-
sumption that some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying
factor entered into the analysis. Clear priority classifica-
tions are plainly relevant to the State's interest in reducing
administrative disputes. Even if the requirement be that
the means bear a "significant relationship" to the state's
purpose, or contribute substantially to its achievement, the
test would seem to have been met in Reed. Only by import-
ing some special suspicion of sex-related means from the
new equal protection area can the result be made entirely
persuasive. Yet application of new equal protection criteria
is precisely what Reed v. Reed purported to avoid.57
The Reed Court did not supply a rationale for the legislation as
it normally would have done in applying the rational basis test. The
Idaho Supreme Court, whose opinion the Court quoted, had profer-
red a legitimate purpose. 58 By acknowledging that purpose, but
overturning the classification as arbitrary, the Court used the
means-focused scrutiny of the Gunther model. In addition, by using
the means-focused approach, the Court avoided the broader consti-
tutional question of gender as a suspect classification. Reed, then,
illustrates all three prongs of Gunther's model.
2. Frontiero.-The Court shifted gears dramatically in Frontiero
v. Richardson,59 a case in which a plurality treated classifications
based on gender as inherently suspect.60 The Frontiero plurality
struck down a federal statute that allowed a male military employee
53. Id. at 77.
54. Id. at 76.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 77.
57. Gunther, supra note 40, at 34.
58. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
59. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
60. Frontiero did not hold that classifications based on gender are inherently suspect.
Rather, only four Justices-Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall-agreed that gen-
der-based classifications are inherently suspect. Id. at 688.
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to declare his spouse as a dependent for the purposes of determin-
ing benefits6 regardless of whether she was actually dependent. A
female military employee, however, could not claim her spouse as a
dependent unless he was actually dependent on her for over one-
half of his support. The use of strict scrutiny in Frontiero necessarily
precludes an analysis based on the Gunther model.62
The Frontiero plurality, however, enumerated four factors neces-
sary for the determination of a suspect classification: (1) the group
within the classification must have suffered a long history of discrim-
ination;63 (2) as a result of this discrimination, statutes must have
become "laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions";64 (3) the clas-
sification must be based on an immutable characteristic, not within
the control of the victims of discrimination;65 and (4) the group
within the classification must historically have lacked political
power.66
The Court has also recognized a fifth factor: if a classification is
an inadequate proxy for a legitimate objective,67 that classification
61. The benefits included increased allowances for quarters, as well as medical and
dental benefits. Id. at 678.
62. In Gunther's opinion, middle level scrutiny made the rational basis test more
rigorous, and essentially left the strict scrutiny test untouched. Gunther, supra note 40,
at 24. The means-oriented nature of the model, however, requires a court to focus on
the statutorily created classifications. As a result, the Supreme Court is more likely to
afford a classification middle level scrutiny if it closely resembles a suspect classification.
This approach is consistent with the Court's preference not to extend strict scrutiny to
classifications other than race or nationality. Although other classifications will not re-
ceive strict scrutiny, they will receive heightened scrutiny if they substantially meet the
criterion for a suspect classification. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gen-
der-based classifications need only serve important governmental objectives and be sub-
stantially related to those objectives).
63. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-87.
64. Id. at 685.
65. Id. at 686.
66. The Frontiero plurality addressed the issue of political powerlessness in a
footnote:
It is true, of course, that when viewed in the abstract, women do not consti-
tute a small and powerless minority. Nevertheless, in part because of past dis-
crimination, women are vastly underrepresented in this Nation's
decisionmaking councils. There has never been a female President, nor a fe-
male member of this Court. Not a single woman presently sits in the United
States Senate, and only 14 women hold seats in the House of Representatives.
And, as appellants point out, this underrepresentation is present throughout all
levels of our State and Federal Government.
Id. at 686 n.17.
67. For example, a legislature that wishes to insure judicial competence might pass a
law requiring that all judicial nominees be white males. Neither the racial nor gender-
based classification would meet the proxy requirement. Neither race nor gender has any
bearing on judicial competence.
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may be suspect.68 The Frontiero plurality considered the proxy re-
quirement implicitly, if not expressly: "[S]tatutory distinctions be-
tween the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the ac-
tual capabilities of its individual members." '69 Since gender generally has
no effect on one's capabilities, it is an inadequate proxy for most, if
not all, possible legislative objectives.
3. Craig.-In Craig v. Boren7 ° the Court retreated from the
strict scrutiny analysis of the Frontiero plurality and, instead, adopted
an approach that closely resembled the Gunther model. The Craig
decision invalidated an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of
beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to females under the
age of eighteen. The Court explicitly found that "[t]o withstand a
constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must serve
some important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives. 71
The Craig Court, therefore, only partially followed the approach
of Frontiero. The Court did not engage in an analysis of all five sus-
pect-class indicia. The opinion did, however, discuss the inaccurate
proxy characteristic. 72 It also alluded to both the historical 73 and
stereotypical74 characteristics of suspect classes.
Craig demonstrates the various aspects of the Gunther model.
The Court examined the objectives underlying the statute.75
Although it could not identify the actual purpose for the legislation,
the Court assumed that the state's representation of that purpose 76
was correct. 7 7 However, in no way did the Court itself try to hypoth-
esize a rationale for the statute. By relying heavily on the proxy
68. See infra note 72.
69. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87 (emphasis added).
70. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
71. Id. at 197. Notably, the Craig Court attributed the "substantial relation" test to
the Reed case. Id. at 204. Although the Court in Reed purported to decide on rational
basis grounds, it also stated: "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation .... ' " Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (citing Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
72. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198, 204 (1976).
73. See id. at 198-99 ("outdated misconceptions").
74. See id. at 198 ("archaic and overbroad generalizations").
75. Id. at 199-204.
76. The State Assistant Attorney General asserted a traffic safety rationale. Id. at
199-200.
77. Although it assumed for purposes of the litigation that traffic safety was the ob-
jective underlying the statute, the Court reserved the question of whether a State Assis-
19861
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
characteristic, the Court emphasized a means-oriented approach.
Finally, the retreat from the Frontiero plurality's treatment of gender
as a suspect classification illustrated the use of heightened scrutiny
as an avoidance technique.
4. Mississippi University for Women. -The most recent equal pro-
tection case in the gender-based area is Mississippi University for Wo-
men v. Hogan78 (MUW). This case provides a good review of the
current state of heightened scrutiny because in it the Court struck a
balance between a rational basis analysis and strict scrutiny.
In MUW the Court held that a state-supported college could
not refuse to admit males to its nursing program.79 Although the
Court was more deferential to the state policy than it would have
been had it applied strict scrutiny, it did not presume the constitu-
tionality of the policy. The opinion contained language relating to
all five indicia of a suspect class.80 In this way the Court continued
to emphasize means scrutiny. MUW also adhered to the final two
prongs of the Gunther model. The Court required an "actual pur-
pose, ' 81 and continued to use heightened scrutiny as an avoidance
technique.8 ' Even though the Court acknowledged that all the ele-
ments of a suspect classification were present, it still refused to ap-
ply strict scrutiny to gender-based classifications.
5. Summary.-The use of heightened scrutiny as an avoidance
technique allows the Court to perceive itself as less interventionist
because it need not impose its own views concerning the legitimacy
and importance of legislative purposes. Heightened scrutiny per-
mits a decision to be based on a narrower ground in two specific
ways. First, it does not expand strict scrutiny beyond its already nar-
rowly defined realm. Second, by emphasizing the legislative classifi-
cation rather than the legitimacy of purpose for the classification,
the Court is able to restrict the constitutional basis for its decision.
Means-oriented scrutiny truly represents a balance between the
deferential rational basis and strict compelling interest standards.
tant Attorney General could normally suggest a legislative purpose. Id. at 199-200 &
n.7.
78. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
79. Id. at 733.
80. Id. at 725-26 & n.10.
81. Id. at 730. By explicitly requiring the actual purpose, MUW seems to go further
in this respect than other cases. Id. at 730 n.16; cf. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200 & n.7
(accepting district court's identification of objective underlying contested statute but
noting that may not be the true purpose).
82. See 458 U.S. at 728-31.
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The balancing posture of Gunther's model is evident in its consider-
ation not just of the statutory means but also of the relationship be-
tween the classification and the governmental objectives. Middle
level scrutiny allows a classification to stand if that classification,
although quasi-suspect in nature, is substantially related to and
serves an important governmental objective. Implicit in this stan-
dard is the understanding that a classification may be relevant and
upheld in some circumstancess3 and irrelevant and struck down in
others.8 4
Having studied middle level scrutiny as it developed in the gen-
der-based cases, we now apply those principles to the Cleburne deci-
sion. Applying a similar analysis to that decision will provide a basis
upon which the Court's reasoning may be scrutinized.
II. THE CLEBURNE DECISION
A. Classification
As in the gender discrimination cases, the Court in Cleburne de-
voted considerable effort to an examination of the indicia of suspect
classifications. Thus, the Cleburne analysis employs the means-fo-
cused scrutiny of the Gunther model. The plurality repeatedly tried
to distinguish the mentally retarded from other quasi-
suspect classes in its analysis of whether mental retardation is a
quasi-suspect classification. Unfortunately for mentally retarded
people, the plurality's lack of candor leads to a distorted view of
reality.
1. Immutability.-The first factor the plurality considered was
immutability. While acknowledging that retardation is an immuta-
ble characteristic, 5 the plurality stated that the judiciary, with its
"ill-informed opinions,"86 is less capable than a legislature to make
substantive judgments concerning mental retardation.87
On a practical level, however, a court must often educate itself
as to the issues before it. Indeed, a court will not be prepared to
adjudicate legitimate legal questions until it is fully informed about
83. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory
rape law applying to males only); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding
statutory classification allowing different calculations for old age benefits depending on
gender).
84. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. 718; Craig, 429 U.S. 190.





the factual issues in a case. If a neutral judiciary cannot so educate
itself, a legislature certainly cannot be expected to escape the influ-
ence of prejudice and bias.
Trying to minimize the immutability characteristic, Justice
White suggested that a state's interest in dealing with and providing
for the retarded is legitimate because of the immutable nature of
retardation. 8 The plurality thus assumed that because retardation
is often relevant to legitimate purposes it should not be subject to
heightened scrutiny. In comparison, however, gender-based classi-
fications have been held relevant in some circumstances8 9 and not in
others.9 0  Yet gender-based classifications receive heightened
scrutiny.
Mental retardation as a classification is no different. For exam-
ple, some laws that single out the mentally retarded assure that they,
as a class, receive equal educational opportunities.9 1 This type of
classification is necessary to protect the educational rights of men-
tally retarded children and is, therefore, relevant to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective. On the other hand, laws requiring the
indiscriminate sterilization of mentally retarded individuals serve no
legitimate governmental objective. 2
Nevertheless, the plurality's attempt to minimize the immutabil-
ity factor was ineffectual. Immutability is important because individ-
uals should not be held responsible for traits over which they have
no control." Certainly, the mentally retarded are not responsible
nor should they be held accountable for their condition. Accord-
ingly, the mentally retarded as a class meet the first test for qualifica-
tion as a quasi-suspect class. Mental retardation is an immutable
characteristic.
2. History of Discrimination .- The second trait of a suspect clas-
sification is historical discrimination. 4 Indeed, the first gender-
88. Id. at 3256 & n.10.
89. See supra note 83.
90. See supra note 84.
91. The Court cited the Education for All Handicapped Children Act as one example
of legislation that was passed to protect the rights of the handicapped, including the
mentally retarded. See infra note 114.
92. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 521-530
(rev. ed. 1985). But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding constitutionality of
Virginia involuntary sterilization statute).
93. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1983) (citing Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
94. In several of the gender-based cases, the Court noted the history of discrimina-
tion against women. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
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based case to set forth these indicia, Frontiero, thoroughly recounted
the history of discrimination against women. 95 But the plurality
opinion in Cleburne was surprisingly silent about historical prejudice
against the mentally retarded. There can be no doubt, however,
about the long and often cruel history of disparate treatment in-
flicted upon the mentally retarded citizens of this country.96 Justice
Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part, summarized the
history of discrimination against the mentally retarded:
During much of the nineteenth century, mental retar-
dation was viewed as neither curable nor dangerous and
the retarded were largely left to their own devices. By the
latter part of the century and during the first decades of the
new one, however, social views of the retarded underwent a
radical transformation. Fueled by the rising tide of Social
Darwinism, the "science" of eugenics, and the extreme
xenophobia of those years, leading medical authorities and
others began to portray the "feeble-minded" as a "menace
to society and civilization ... responsible in a large degree
for many, if not all, of our social problems." A regime of
state-mandated segregation and degradation soon
emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and in-
deed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive
custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded
for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded
and "nearly extinguish their race." Retarded children were
categorically excluded from public schools, based on the
false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the pur-
ported need to protect nonretarded children from them.
State laws deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship."
Segregation was accompanied by eugenic marriage
and sterilization laws that extinguished for the retarded
one of the "basic civil rights of man"-the right to marry
and procreate.97
Dehumanizing conditions in institutions exist even today. In
1976, Wolf Wolfensberger, writing of the legacy of institutions for
n.10 (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
317 (1977).
95. 411 U.S. at 684-87.
96. For a more in-depth review of the historical roots of discrimination against the
mentally retarded, see S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE (1983).
Also, for a very powerful pictorial essay concerning conditions of institutional treatment,
see B. BLATT, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY (1974).
97. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266-67 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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the mentally retarded, stated that the "institution [had become] a
purgatory . . . an agency of dehumanization [where] residents are
subjected to physical and mental abuse, to neglect and inadequate
care and services, to environmental deprivation, and to restriction
of the most basic rights and dignities of a citizen. '"98
Perhaps the plurality could find no effective way to discuss the
extensive history of discrimination against the retarded without ac-
knowledging the need for heightened scrutiny of classifications
based on mental retardation. This may explain the conspicuous lack
of discussion of the subject in the plurality opinion. Surely a group.
whose members over the years have been referred to as "defectives"
and "animals," 9 9 blamed for the moral and social ills of society, 00
and subjected to the degrading and dehumanizing conditions of in-
stitutional living' 0 can lay claim to extensive historical prejudice.
That history is one of the strongest indications of the suspect nature
of classifications based on mental retardation. To ensure that statu-
tory classifications based on retardation are free from the effects of
historical prejudice, courts must employ a higher level of scrutiny.
3. Negative Stereotypes.-Historical discrimination is also re-
flected in the third characteristic associated with suspect classifica-
tions, that is, the presence of negative stereotypical views toward the
class. Stereotypes are noted prominently in several of the gender-
based equal protection cases. 10 2 The Frontiero plurality suggested
that the historical "romantic paternalism"'0 3 of the nineteenth cen-
tury resulted in "our statute books gradually bec[oming] laden with
gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes .... ""' The
Court went on to discuss the effect of those stereotypical notions on
the basic civil rights of women. Stereotypical notions kept women
from holding office, serving on juries, voting, or holding property in
98. Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models, in CHANGING PAT-
TERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 70 (President's Commit-
tee on Mental Retardation 1976).
99. Id. at 39-40.
100. Id. at 54-56.
101. For relatively recent examples, see Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-11
(5th Cir. 1974); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1308-10 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev d, 451
U.S. 1 (1981).
102. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 729 (1982);
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977);
and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976).
103. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
104. Id. at 685.
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a legal capacity.' 5 Many of those same civil rights are still denied to
the retarded today.
One need only consider the history of the eugenics movement
to realize the pervasive effect of negative stereotypes on the civil
rights of mentally retarded persons.' 0 6 During the early 1900s, the
widely held stereotype of the mentally retarded as criminals, moral
degenerates, inebriates, and prostitutes led to calls for total segre-
gation and the eugenic sterilization laws.' 0 7 The legacy of institu-
tionalization and the sterilization laws is still evident today.'0 8 This
legacy manifests itself in the deprivation or restriction of rights such
as marriage, sexual freedom, procreation, property ownership, lib-
erty, and voting.109
In determining the level of scrutiny required, the plurality in
Cleburne ignored the historical discrimination against the retarded.
As a result, it failed to discuss adequately the effect of these negative
stereotypes on legislatures. Perhaps the best example of the nega-
tive effects that stereotypes can have on legislation is the very ordi-
nance before the Court in Cleburne."' In fact, the plurality
concluded "that requiring the [special use] permit in this case ap-
pears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded . . ."'11
Prejudicial views may generally be characterized as stereotypi-
cal. The Cleburne zoning ordinance, which the plurality viewed as
prejudicial, was, in part, the product of the stereotypical views of the
retarded held by the city council members who drafted and enforced
the ordinance. Instead of changing the outmoded language in the
zoning ordinance, the city council classified the group home as a
"hospital for the feebleminded.""' 2 The notion that hospitals for
the feebleminded should be segregated, preferably out in the coun-
try, is one explanation for the city council's refusal to grant the spe-
cial use permit. The denial may also reflect the stereotype that the
retarded cannot live successfully in the community.
According to the Cleburne plurality, legislative efforts to provide
105. Id.
106. See S. HERR, supra note 96, at 22-24.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 92.
109. See Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND
THE LAW 2-26 (President's Committee on Mental Retardation 1976).
110. See supra note 2.
111. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
112. Id. at 3253.
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the mentally retarded with certain basic civil rights" 3 "belie[] a con-
tinuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more
intrusive oversight by the judiciary."' 14 Legislative efforts to reduce
discrimination based on gender, however, enjoyed a warmer recep-
tion from the Court. Indeed, in Orr v. Orr.15 the Court implicity
recognized the danger of statutes that reinforce stereotypes; thus, it
applied heightened scrutiny:
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and
burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of
reinforcing stereotypes about the "proper place" of wo-
men and their need for special protection .... Thus, even
statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ame-
liorate the effects of past discrimination must be carefully
tailored.' 16
Similarly, because stereotypes about the mentally retarded still
abound today, statutes that compensate them for past injustices
must not reinforce those stereotypes. Courts, therefore, should
carefully scrutinize classifications based on mental retardation. Leg-
islators are no less affected by stereotypes concerning the mentally
retarded than they are by stereotypes concerning women. Nor is the
plurality spared the possible effects of stereotypes and prejudice in
its own interpretation of these statutes. In fact, recent Supreme
Court cases in the disability area show that these negative stereo-
types have influenced the Court.
In three major decisions the Supreme Court has undercut the
enforcement of statutes providing protection to mentally retarded
persons. First, in Board of Education v. Rowley' 7 the Court inter-
preted certain provisions of Public Law 94-142, the Education for
113. The Court noted several major pieces of legislation passed by Congress over the
last several years. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256. The list includes § 504 of The Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), (outlawing discrimination against the handi-
capped in federally funded programs); The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010(l)-(2) (1982), recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 6009(1)-(2)
(Supp. III 1985) (seemingly guaranteeing the retarded the right to appropriate treat-
ment, services, and rehabilitation in the least restrictive setting); The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982) (assuring the right of re-
tarded children to a free and appropriate education in the least restrictive setting). The
Court, however, has severely limited the protections afforded by these statutes. See infra
notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
114. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
115. 440 U.S. 268.
116. Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
117. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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All Handicapped Children Act,"" which guarantees a free appropri-
ate public education to all handicapped children. The Court deter-
mined that the law did not mandate strict equality between
handicapped and nonhandicapped individuals. Nor did it require
states "to maximize the potential of each handicapped child com-
mensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped chil-
dren.""'  Instead, the Court construed the Act to require only
access to a free education "sufficient to confer some educational
benefit upon the handicapped child."' 20
Second, in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman 121 the Court nar-
rowly construed the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act of 1975.122 It held that section 6010, the Act's Bill of
Rights, created no new substantive rights for the mentally re-
tarded. 2 ' Rather, the Court said, section 6010 represented general
findings and policy statements by Congress. -'2 4
Finally, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis 125 the Court
evaluated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.' 26 That statute, the
Court held, imposed no obligation on state educational facilities "to
lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accom-
modate a handicapped person.' '1 27
In each of these cases the Court narrowly construed statutes
intended to remedy prior injustices. The conflict between the
Cleburne plurality's view that the existence of these statutes is indica-
tive of historical prejudice against the retarded, and the Court's con-
sistently narrow interpretations of the protections created by these
statutes, is patent. The Court cannot have it both ways. Perhaps the
Court itself is unable to shake the effects of negative stereotypes.
4. Political Powerlessness .- The Cleburne plurality did discuss the
fourth characteristic of suspect classifications, political powerless-
ness. It is readily apparent from the gender-based cases that polit-
ical powerlessness has long been considered a characteristic of a
118. See supra note 113.
119. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
120. Id.
121. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
122. See supra note 113.
123. Id. at 18.
124. Id. at 22-23.
125. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
126. See supra note 113.
127. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 413.
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suspect classification.' 28 Directly addressing the issue, the plurality
suggested that recent legislation 29 "negates any claim that the
mentally retarded are politically powerless .. ".." ,30 In a separate
opinion, however, Justice Marshall noted that implicit in the plural-
ity's reasoning is the view that "[o]nce society begins to recognize
certain practices as discriminatory, in part because previously stig-
matized groups have mobilized politically to lift this stigma, the
Court [should] refrain from approaching such practices with the ad-
ded skepticism of heightened scrutiny."'
' 3 1
In neither the gender-based nor the racial classification deci-
sions has the Court exercised the kind of restraint that the Cleburne
plurality envisions. The enactment of the civil rights legislation of
the 1960s demonstrates that Congress has long recognized the in-
vidiousness of racial discrimination. Even so, in 1984, the Court ap-
plied strict scrutiny to a statute that employed a racial
classification.'1 2 Thus, despite increased awareness of racial dis-
crimination and efforts to ameliorate its effects there has been no
reduction in the level of judicial scrutiny. 133
When addressing the issue of political powerlessness in a gen-
der-based context, the Court's reasoning was also different. In Fron-
tiero the plurality noted that Congress had become increasingly
sensitive to gender-based classifications.' 3 4 Thus, Justice Brennan
asserted, if Congress itself had taken notice of such classifications,
the judiciary ought to afford gender-based classifications stricter
scrutiny.' 35 If increased legislative activity in the area of gender-
based classifications justified stricter scrutiny, then increased legisla-
tive activities in the area of mental retardation also indicates a need
for heightened scrutiny.
Since heightened legislative awareness is not enough to negate
the political powerlessness requirement, the Court has yet to decide
whether the retarded are politically powerless. In Fronterio the plu-
rality concluded that women, even though they do not constitute a
128. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 n.10 (1982);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973).
129. See supra notes 113, 117-127 and accompanying text.
130. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
131. Id. at 3268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
133. The same can be said of middle level scrutiny of gender-based classifications. In
Mississippi Univ. for Women the Court used heightened scrutiny. But this was long after
society had begun to correct gender-based discrimination.
134. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973).
135. Id. at 687-89.
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small and powerless minority, were nonetheless politically power-
less. 1 36 Inadequate representation in politics supported this conclu-
sion. At that time there had never been a female Supreme Court
Justice; and there were only fourteen female members of Con-
gress-none of whom were United States Senators. Further, a simi-
lar situation existed at both the state and the local government
levels. 137
Obviously, the mentally retarded are not even close to acquir-
ing the same political power as women. This is especially true with
reference to representation on decisionmaking panels or councils.
In this sense the mentally retarded are truly a "discrete and insular
minority ... [whose] special condition ... tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities." 138 Discrimination against the mentally
retarded, therefore, "may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry."' 139 Because of this, and because legislative efforts
to protect the retarded are not a basis upon which to justify a lower
level of judicial scrutiny, the mentally retarded are, in fact, a politi-
cally powerless group.
5. The Proxy Requirement.-Through the proxy requirement, the
Court attempts to determine whether the relationship between the
legislative purpose and the classification is sufficiently close. The
gender-based discrimination cases illustrate the Court's use of this
requirement to determine the level of scrutiny that it affords to a
certain classification.14 ° As the Court asserted in MUW:
The need for the requirement is amply revealed by refer-
ence to the broad range of statutes already invalidated by
this Court, statutes that relied upon the simplistic, out-
dated assumption that gender could be used as a "proxy
for other, more germane bases of classification," . . . to es-
tablish a link between objective and classification. 41
The Cleburne plurality did not explicitly discuss the proxy re-
quirement. As Justice Marshall observed, however, it is implicit in
the plurality's holding that "mental retardation per se cannot be a
136. Id. at 686 & n. 17.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190, 198, 204 (1976).
141. 458 U.S. at 726 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 198).
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proxy for depriving retarded people of their rights and interests
without regard to variations in individual ability."'' 42  In other
words, the use of the classification did not substantially further any
of the asserted purposes of the Cleburne zoning ordinance. 143
In middle level scrutiny the proxy requirement is more flexible
than it is under strict scrutiny. In some cases the classification may
be legitimate and relevant, while in other cases it may not.14
4
Although middle level classifications for the most part must meet
the five requirements of a suspect class, such classifications are at
times legitimate. For this reason, Justice Marshall maintained that
the Court should apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based
on mental retardation. 145
Mental retardation may indeed be a legitimate classification in
some circumstances but not in others. For example, mental retarda-
tion is certainly a legitimate classification in the federal law provid-
ing access to a free appropriate public education. 146 As the Cleburne
plurality found, however, in a zoning case the classification illegiti-
mately rested upon an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded. 14
7
That a given classification is legitimate at some times and not at
others cannot be reconciled with the plurality's view that a group
having characteristics that the state may take into account should
virtually never be accorded heightened scrutiny. The plurality failed
to distinguish the gender-based cases, in which the Court itself
found gender to be an adequate proxy in some cases and not in
others. 4  According to the plurality, heightened scrutiny is inap-
propriate when many of the legislative classifications affecting the
group are likely to be valid. ' Logically this argument cannot with-
stand scrutiny. As Justice Marshall noted: "An inquiry into consti-
tutional principle, not mathematics, determines whether heightened
scrutiny is appropriate." 1
50
In the final analysis, the proxy requirement is substantially the
142. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis in original).
143. See supra note 10.
144. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
145. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3270 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
146. See supra note 113.
147. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
148. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
149. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
150. Id. at 3271 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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same regardless of whether the classification is based on gender or
mental retardation. Indeed, classifications based on mental retarda-
tion meet all of the criteria for application of heightened scrutiny.
As the plurality acknowledged, mental retardation is an immutable
characteristic.' 51 Historically, the retarded have been subjected to
widespread prejudice. They are politically powerless, and have
been burdened with significant stereotypes. Finally, as Justice Mar-
shall remarked, in some circumstances mental retardation is not a
legitimate proxy for the rights and interests of the retarded. 152 Ap-
plication of these principles demonstrate that heightened scrutiny is
appropriate for classifications based on mental retardation.
6. The Plurality Opinion: Heightened Scrutiny in Disguise.-The
Cleburne plurality stated that a rational basis standard is the appro-
priate level of scrutiny. The plurality's opinion, however, suggested
the application of heightened scrutiny. The decision seems to reject
the rational basis standard in two respects. First, the analysis gener-
ally fits Gunther's model of heightened scrutiny. Second, the ra-
tional basis standard does not normally result in an "as applied"
test: The Court will normally uphold a statute that is applied un-
constitutionally if the statute is constitutional on its face.' 53
B. Application of Heightened Scrutiny Analysis
1. Scrutiny of the City's Rationale.-The Cleburne plurality's analy-
sis clearly adhered to the first prong of the Gunther model.' 54
When a court applies a rational basis test, it is free to hypothesize or
supply its own legitimate governmental purpose that is rationally re-
lated to the classification. Under the heightened scrutiny approach
as described in the Gunther model, however, courts required the
legislature whose statute was being challenged to supply its own ra-
tionale. The Cleburne plurality not only refused to supply its own
rationale, but also engaged in a searching inquiry into the rationale
supplied by the City.'
The City suggested several possible rationales for requiring a
special permit for the group home. First, the negative attitudes of
property owners within 200 feet of the proposed group home trou-
151. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 142.
153. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (invalidating
statute that denied food stamps to households with persons over eighteen years of age
who had been declared dependent children for tax purposes in a prior year).
154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
155. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3259-60.
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bled the City. The plurality dismantled this argument: "[M]ere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are
properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible"' 56
objectives to justify the classification. The plurality cited a strict-
scrutiny case for the proposition that the law may not give effect to
private biases.' Justice White refused to draw the inference that
the City's concern had more to do with the safety of the retarded
residents than with the negative attitudes of their neighbors.
Next, Justice White discussed the City's concern about the loca-
tion of the group home. Because the home was to be located across
the street from a junior high school, the City feared that the stu-
dents might harass the home's residents.' 5 8 But the plurality found
these fears insufficient to justify the classification, just as the nega-
tive attitudes of their neighbors were insufficient."'
The third reason the City offered involved the group home's
location on a 500-year flood plain.' 60 The plurality could see no
reason for this concern: the City had not required nursing homes,
convalescent homes, or hospitals to obtain special use permits.
16 1
Fourth, the City asserted that the home would house too many
people. The plurality again found this argument meritless: similar
restrictions under the zoning ordinance did not bind boarding
houses, nursing homes, or family dwellings. 162
The plurality's reasoning in this area seems inconsistent. Nu-
merous federal and state statutes and regulations govern living con-
ditions in various facilities, both institutional and community-
based.' 63 The Court has never considered that these laws, which set
size and density requirements, effect a denial of equal protection. In
fact, the plurality cited one of these regulations, the ICF-MR square-
footage-per-resident requirement,' 64 in its opinion. The plurality
failed to explain why the City could not constitutionally impose its
156. Id. at 3259.
157. Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).




162. Id. at 3259-60.
163. See, e.g., MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 22.03.23-24, for Maryland state regulations on
per-square-foot requirements and general living conditions in group homes for the
mentally retarded. For example, § 22.03.24B requires that there be at least three feet
between each bed and, for multiple bedrooms, that there be at least 60 square feet per
bed. See also 42 C.F.R. § 442.447 (1985) (setting out square footage requirments for
bedrooms in intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF-MR)).
164. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 442.447).
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own population density requirements on the home while the federal
government and the states are free to do so.
The plurality also suggested that the City's concerns about con-
centration of population, traffic congestion, fire hazards, and neigh-
borhood security did not adequately support the classification.' 65
Justice White pointed out that these concerns also apply to apart-
ment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, and hospitals, none of
which needs a special use permit.' 66
In the past, however, a legislature has always been free to ad-
dress public concerns "one step at a time" 167 under the rational ba-
sis test. "If a classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not
offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.' ",168 The failure to allow a "one step at a time" ap-
proach suggests that the plurality in fact applied a heightened scru-
tiny test.
Because it refused to supply justifications that were readily ap-
parent, and because it looked only to the record,' 69 the plurality's
analysis coincides with the first prong of Gunther's model.
2. Means Scrutiny .- The second prong of the Gunther model is
the means-scrutiny requirement. 70  The Cleburne plurality thor-
oughly analyzed the classification, as the Gunther model required,
but refused to hold that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect
classification. '7'
Although the Court purported to apply the rational basis test,
consideration of all the factors can only lead to the conclusion that
the classification analysis was part of a de facto application of height-
ened scrutiny. Just as Gunther noted that the Reed case made no
sense without importing some special suspicion of gender-based
classifications, 72 Cleburne makes no sense without importing an ele-
ment of increased suspicion of classifications based on mental retar-
165. Id. at 3260.
166. Id.
167. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
168. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
169. The plurality expressly stated: "[T]he record does not reveal any rational basis
.... Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
170. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
171. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255-56.
172. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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dation. In effect, the plurality engaged in a means-focused scrutiny
which is sufficient to meet the second prong of the Gunther model.
3. Means-Scrutiny as an Avoidance Technique.-The final prong of
the Gunther model is the use of means-scrutiny as an avoidance
technique. 7 3 The plurality opinion adheres to this final prong of
the model, but with a slight variation from the gender-based cases.
In the gender-based cases, the Court applied a middle level of
scrutiny to avoid a determination that a suspect classification could
be based on gender.' 7" It is indicative of how well developed
heightened scrutiny is today that the Cleburne plurality tried to avoid
an extension of middle level scrutiny. Just as the Court's reluctance
to extend strict scrutiny to gender-based classifications resulted in
the creation of a new middle level of scrutiny, the plurality's reluc-
tance to extend middle level scrutiny to new classifications, includ-
ing mental retardation, foreshadows a new step in the evolution of
equal protection analysis. This new step is the development of the
"as applied" test.
C. The "As Applied" Test
The "as applied" test allowed the plurality to give redress to
the potential residents of the group home without expressly ex-
tending heightened scrutiny to the mentally retarded as a class. Nor
did the Court find it necessary to strike down the applicable section
of the Cleburne zoning ordinance as unconstitutional on its face.
Citing the desire to avoid unnecessarily broad constitutional judg-
ments, the plurality suggested that the preferred course of adjudica-
tion would be to decide whether the zoning ordinance violated
equal protection as applied in the present case. 175 This approach
relieved the Court of the duty of deciding whether the ordinance or
one of its sections was facially invalid.' 76
The decision to use an "as applied" test in an equal protection
case is unprecedented. The authority cited by the plurality as sup-
porting its view is easily distinquishable. All the cases cited dealt
with first amendment, not equal protection, questions. 7 7 More-
173. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
174. Gunther, supra note 40, at 29-30.
175. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
176. Id.
177. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985) (lower court should
not have struck down Washington moral nuisance statute in its entirety since statute
reached material inciting normal as well as prurient interest in gender); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (statute prohibiting actions designed to bring into public
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over, ample precedent exists to suggest that if a statute or subsec-
tion of a statute violates equal protection, the Court should strike
down the entire statute.1 78 Justice Marshall recounted the case law
on this point, 179 and observed that "[i]f a discriminatory purpose
infects a legislative act, the act itself is inconsistent with the equal
protection clause and cannot validly be applied to anyone."'' 80
In effect, the "as applied" test allowed the plurality to assess the
ordinance with heightened scrutiny. The result may reflect a com-
promise between restricting the use of heightened scrutiny for all
classifications based on mental retardation and acknowledging that
in some cases such classifications must receive more than a minimal
level of scrutiny. The result is de facto heightened scrutiny under
the rubric of a rational basis test. This is evident in the plurality's
extensive analysis of suspect indicia, its refusal to supply readily
available legislative purposes, and its inquiry into and rejection of
the purposes supplied by the City. By refusing to explicitly label its
treatment as heightened scrutiny, and by using the "as applied" test,
the plurality forged new ground. Its new approach, however, will
probably be short-lived.
D. Future Directions
1. The Future of the "As Applied Test.-The "as applied" test is
not likely to become a permanent fixture in equal protection juris-
prudence. As Justice Marshall noted, the test is standardless: it
does not indicate when the City might legitimately apply the ordi-
nance to other retarded persons not directly affected by the Cleburne
decision. 18 Furthermore, the plurality did not indicate when the
Court should undertake a more searching inquiry under this invigo-
rated rational basis test. 182
The "as applied" test can only lead to instability in both statu-
notice any party, organization, or movement struck down only as it applied to sidewalks
around Supreme Court, not areas on Supreme Court grounds or in the building);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (statutes may not prohibit certain modes of ex-
pression and association protected by first and fourteenth amendments).
178. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking down statute that re-
quired parental consent for adoption from unwed mothers but not unwed fathers);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (striking down maternity leave
policy in toto rather than as applied to plaintiff while assuming that the policy may have
been justified as applied to some women).
179. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3274 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3273.
182. Id. at 3265.
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tory and constitutional law. It will allow courts, supposedly under a
rational basis standard, to strike down an otherwise valid statute as
it applies to a particular group. A statute such as the Cleburne zon-
ing ordinance may be reviewed under the traditional rational basis
test for some groups and under a more rigorous form of scrutiny for
other groups. Not only may the same statute be reviewed under two
different levels of scrutiny, it may end up being constitutional as ap-
plied to one group and unconstitutional as applied to another.
For example, in the future, the Cleburne ordinance will have
little effect as it applies to group homes for the retarded; yet the City
may apply the same section of that ordinance to a home for the
mentally ill or a half-way house for convicts. Conceivably, if a court
applied a true rational basis test, the statute could be upheld as it
applied to one or both of these two groups.
Without further refinement of the standards that will trigger the
"as applied" test, statutory law will be riddled with exceptions in
favor of any group that can make a legitimate claim that the law rests
upon an irrational prejudice. By rejecting mental retardation as a
quasi-suspect classification, and by striking down the statute as ap-
plied because it was based on irrational prejudice, the plurality es-
tablished an easy standard for other groups to meet. Once the
Court sets out to define exceptions in the equal protection area,
equal application of the law becomes elusive. Indeed, even if the
Court does refine its standards, some statutes will inevitably be le-
gitimate in some circumstances but not in others. The resulting un-
certainty can only confuse those charged with enforcing those
statutes.
Perhaps the Cleburne result stems from the inability of the cur-
rent three-tiered system to adequately protect certain groups from
discrimination. The Court's desire to protect groups from unequal
treatment on the one hand, and its desire to avoid interventionism
on the other, has produced a dilemma. The Cleburne Court evi-
denced a special sensitivity for the mentally retarded. Yet, at least
four members of the Court are unwilling, at least explicitly, to ex-
tend middle level scrutiny to classifications based on mental retarda-
tion. Because of the lack of standards and the instability that will
most certainly surround application of the "as applied" test, Cleburne
must be viewed beyond its narrow holding.
The "as applied" test is as an evolutionary step in equal protec-
tion analysis. In actuality, it is a step toward the extinction of the
semantic distinctions represented by terms such as "tiered scru-
tiny," "rational basis," "heightened scrutiny," or "strict scrutiny."
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Justices Stevens and Marshall have both proffered schemes that re-
ject the three-tiered system.
2. The Stevens Model.-Justice Stevens' model proposes a "con-
tinuum of judgmental responses," ''"3 in which all cases are subject
to a series of analytical questions.1 4 The questions, which are the
same regardless of the classification, will pursue the issues of "legiti-
macy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance
of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially."' 85
The Stevens model is easy to apply. The first questions are:
Which class does the legislation harm; and, has that class been sub-
ject to a tradition of disfavor?' 86 A court could, but would not be
required to, take notice of history, stereotypes, and political
powerlessness. From a common sense point of view, however,
heightened scrutiny should be expected for classifications based on
groups, such as women and the mentally retarded, that have tradi-
tionally suffered discrimination.
The Stevens model would only scrutinize laws that are harmful
to members of a particular class.' 8" Thus, statutory classifications
that bestow a benefit upon the class would not violate the Constitu-
tion. Heightened scrutiny, therefore, could not have a chilling effect
on legislation intended to benefit a particular group.
Next, Justice Stevens would inquire into the purpose that the
law serves.' 88 Any given public purpose can fall within a continuum
ranging from totally arbitrary to highly relevant. For example, if the
purpose of a law is to provide training and job opportunities for the
mentally retarded, the Court should perceive this as a relevant and
worthy goal, especially since the class has traditionally been subject
to disfavor. On the other hand, a law such as the zoning ordinance
challenged in Cleburne should be considered arbitrary: it prevents
183. Id. at 3261 (Stevens, J., concurring).
184. Justice Stevens listed the following questions:
(1) "What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tradi-
tion of disfavor' by our laws?"
(2) "What is the public purpose that is being served by the law?"
(3) "What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate
treatment?"
Id. at 3261-62.
185. Id. at 3261.
186. See supra note 184.
187. By asking only what class is harmed by the legislation, Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261
(Stevens,J, concurring),Justice Stevens excluded from equal protection analysis legisla-
tion that benefits a given class.
188. Id. at 3261-62.
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the establishment of group homes and, therefore, is harmful to the
class.
Finally, Justice Stevens' model isolates the characteristics of the
class that justified disparate treatment. s9 The job training law in
the example above would allow consideration of class members'
ability to learn job skills if they receive the appropriate opportunity.
Mental retardation, on the other hand, is not relevant to the location
of living arrangements, as in a zoning ordinance such as Cleburne's.
In essence, the Stevens model provides a common sense bal-
ancing approach. When the answers to all three questions are
weighed against each other, a neutral court will be able to determine
the legitimacy of a given classification.
3. The Marshall Model .- Justice Marshall's model, although
similar, is couched in different terms. Equal protection in the Mar-
shall model depends on the constitutional and societal importance
of the adversely affected interests, as well as the invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.' 9 °
The Marshall model's sensitivity to societal attitudes may be
good or bad depending on the particular views society may espouse
at a given time. Justice Marshall's approach will enable the law to
reflect societal attitudes in a more contemporaneous fashion, rather
than lagging behind society's views. Emphasis on the constitutional
importance of the threatened interest may cut both ways depending
on the makeup of the Court. Liberal Justices would view housing as
an important constitutional interest. Other Justices, though, might
not agree.' 9 ' By emphasizing the invidious nature of the classifica-
tion, the Marshall model also takes into account historical prejudice,
stereotypes, political powerlessness, and immutability. As in the
Stevens model, however, these factors are balanced against constitu-
tional and societal interests.
4. Combining the Marshall and Stevens Models.-By coupling Jus-
tice Marshall's emphasis on the constitutional and societal impor-
tance of the affected interests with Justice Stevens' emphasis on
legislative goals, the Court could devise a model in which levels of
scrutiny are not at issue. The Marshall model's emphasis on the
constitutional and societal importance of affected interests provides
a standard for determining whether a classification is harmful under
189. Id. at 3262.
190. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. See supra note 37.
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the Stevens model. Furthermore, if these two models were com-
bined, the Court could consider legislative purposes and objectives
in light of statutory classifications. An emphasis on common sense
would characterize the new model's interpretation.
This approach lends itself to a narrower, case-by-case analysis
that employs a balancing test of relevant factors. Both models look
to the characteristics of the group at issue, rather than pushing a
classification into one of three or four preconceived levels into
which it does not quite fit. In this sense, both models allow what
Justice Stevens termed a "continuum of judgmental responses "192
under one standard-equal protection.
E. Conclusion
Cleburne exemplifies the Court's struggle to deal with groups
that meet most, if not all, of the characteristics of a suspect or quasi-
suspect class.1 9' The plurality applied a type of heightened scrutiny
that lacks a formal label. Through its "as applied" test, the plurality
creatively avoided the formal extension of middle level scrutiny be-
yond its current bounds. The "as applied" standard, though, can-
not last. Its lack of principled standards and its apparent tendency
to create statutory and constitutional instability will, in all likeli-
hood, lead to the next step in the evolution of equal protection.
That next step will produce a model that de-emphasizes the levels of
judicial scrutiny and allows the Court to proceed on a case-by-case
basis.
Cleburne takes a step toward an equal protection jurisprudence
that will produce decisions that are more just and more principled
than those of the past. Until then, however, Cleburne strongly indi-
cates that, regardless of the form of inquiry, the Court has served
notice that arbitrary discrimination against the mentally retarded is
intolerable. The rigorous treatment the Cleburne zoning ordinance
received, despite the plurality's lack of candor, should, at the very
least, dissuade other jurisdictions from attempting to implement
discriminatory zoning practices.
JOHN D. WILSON*
192. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261 (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. A classification based on mental illness is one such group. Classifications defined
to include individuals carrying the AIDS virus may be another.
* This paper began as a writing project for a seminar on The Civil Rights of the
Handicapped taught by Professor Stanley Herr. The author would like to express his
gratitude to Professor Herr for his help and guidance on this project.
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